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EVALUATING CHILD CARE LEGISLATION:
PROGRAM STRUCTURES AND POLITICAL
CONSEQUENCES
LANCE LIEBMAN*
The American political system is not good at choosing among
worthy goals and then adopting programs well designed to
achieve the desired purposes. Scholars and activists continue
to debate the success and failure of the last quarter century of
efforts to reduce inequality and achieve other social reforms.'
But we have no well developed methodology for evaluating
proposed programs and attempting to predict their likely
consequences.
This Article asks what we know about choosing legal struc-
tures for programmatic efforts that seek social change. In par-
ticular, it asks whether we can predict relationships between
different ways of pursuing public ends and likely outcomes. It
does so by exploring various models for additional government
involvement in providing care to children with working parents.
The subject is timely because many political leaders recognize
that demographic changes in the labor force have made the non-
working parent a rare commodity, and that these changes seem
irreversible. 2 It seems likely that even at a time of stringency
for public budgets, government will make new and expensive
commitments to child care. Indeed, at this moment major initia-
tives are pending in Congress.3 In addition, different states-
functioning, in this instance, as the social laboratories that Jus-
tice Brandeis championed-are operating child care programs
* Professor of law, Harvard Law School. B.A., Yale College, 1962;M.A., Cambridge,
1964; LL.B., Harvard Law School, 1967.
Canada ' See, e.g., HTING POVERTY: WHAT WORKS AND WHAT DOESN'T (S. Danziger
& D. Weinberg ed. 1986); L. SCHORR & D. SCHORR, WITHIN OUR REACH: BREAIUNG
THE CYCLE OF DISADVANTAGE (1988); SOCIAL EXPERIMENTATION (J. Hausman & D.
Wise ed. 1985); R. HAVEMAN, POVERTY POLICY AND POVERTY RESEARCH: THE GREAT
SOCIETY AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (1987).
2 In 1988, both presidential candidates proposed reforms of child care; for Bush's
proposal, see N.Y. Times, July 25, 1988, § 1, at 1, col. 1; for Dukakis' plan, see Mike
Dukakis for President, Quality Day Care for America's Children (1988) (unpublished
position paper, on file at the HARV. J. ON LEGIS.).
3 See infra notes 75-89 and accompanying text.
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that vary significantly in nature and approach. 4 It therefore
seems appropriate to view the choices among alternative pro-
grammatic structures for improving the system of child care as
a case study in the attempt to predict the consequences of
particular varieties of government intervention. What can we
say about how the form of a new child care program will influ-
ence social ideas and arrangements in the future?
I. THE PROBLEM IMAGINED AND DESCRIBED
Politicians, reformers, and social commentators all declare
that there is a child care problem. 5 Most call it a crisis. Fre-
quently, they cite the same few studies and announce the dis-
covery of the same shocking numbers. But the child care prob-
lem is in fact several problems, and much of the argument over
solutions can be won by seizing control of the diagnosis.
Parents who seek a facility in which to place a three-year-old
for eight hours a day,6 five days a week, in a large city, will
need to pay at least $2000 per year, and quite possibly signifi-
cantly more.7 The relevant cost variables are immediately ap-
parent: rent; ratio of staff to children; skill level of staff as
reflected in pay; additional services (meals, medical and dental,
field trips); liability insurance, especially for abuse; and return
on capital investment.
Society can provide child care only by foregoing other uses
for the land, labor, and capital that high-quality child care re-
4 For an account of state programs, see U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, CHILD CARE: A
WORKFORCE ISSUE 57-124 (1988) [hereinafter A WORKFORCE ISSUE]; CHILDREN'S DE-
FENSE FUND, STATE CHILD CARE FACT BOOK (1987).
5 See, e.g., CHILDREN'S DEFENSE FUND, STATE CHILD CARE FACT BOOK 1 (1987):
"[Alt a time when a growing number of American families desperately need child care,
federal child care spending remains terribly inadequate and states, despite many re-
sponsible efforts, are unable to fill any but a fraction of the funding gaps"; GOVERNOR'S
OFFICE OF HUMAN RESOURCES, COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS, FINAL REPORT
OF THE GOVERNOR's DAY CARE PARTNERSHIP INITIATIVE at ix (1987): "The changing
composition of the workforce, and a concern for the well-being of children and families,
creates a serious need for more day care that is safe, of high quality and affordable to
working families"; 133 CONG. REc. S12,019-S12,020 (daily ed. Sept. 11, 1987) (statement
of Senator Orrin Hatch): "[Miothers are forced daily to make untenable choices regard-
ing their children's welfare .... It is time to face reality. Our failure to do so jeopardizes
the growth and development of the next generation of Americans ....
6 With lunch and commuting time, an eight-hour worker needs more than eight hours
of child care.
I A WORKFORCE ISSUE, supra note 4, at 161-63. In Boston, day care can cost as
much as $7000 a year. See Boston Globe, Feb. 23, 1989, at 31, col. 2.
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quires .8 Proposals to restructure the child care system must
confront issues that also arise in the contexts of such "necess-
ities" as housing, food, fuel, clothing, transportation, and med-
ical care. Advocates of new government child care programs
typically embrace one or more of the following tenets.
A. Society Should Devote More Resources to Child Care
One argument in support of certain proposed programs is that
individuals do not purchase enough child care, with the result
that the society as a whole obtains too little. Americans care
about their children, are anxious when they leave their children
and go to work, and invest resources in efforts to improve their
children's opportunities. Yet it is possible to argue that the total
of individual families' expenditures for child care is insufficient.
Two theories could explain a social decision to seek additional
expenditures for child care. One is that good child care may
have external benefits. That is, leaving children in settings that
are unsafe or do not encourage the children's development may
lead to tragic outcomes that society in general weighs more than
the parents of those children do; or may bring consequences
(lack of education, propensity for criminal conduct) that soon
impose real costs on society. It strains credulity to argue that
society's concern for children in general is greater than the
commitment of parents to their own children, but the argument
can at least be hypothetically stated.
Second, the mechanisms of social decision (politics and leg-
islation) may value the future at a higher rate than the spending/
investment decisions of individuals acting through economic
markets. Politics may employ a different interest rate than eco-
nomics. Given the cumulative impact of our recent political
decisions (deficits, impoverished public capital investment, raids
on pension funds, and so on), this argument too may be hard to
make. Nevertheless, it is possible to argue that a political de-
See V. FUCHS, WOMEN'S QUEST FOR ECONOMIC EQUALITY 5 (1988):
[An "economic perspective". . . means recognizing that we do not live in the
Garden of Eden. In the Garden scarcity was unknown, but everywhere else
human wants exceed available resources .... From this perspective, terms
like "free daycare" or "low-cost daycare" are misleading because daycare
requires labor, land, and capital that could be used to satisfy some other want;
it cannot ever really be free, and good-quality care cannot be low cost. The
true social cost of daycare is the value of the foregone alternatives as reflected
in the resources used to produce the care.
1989]
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cision about how much care should be provided to the nation's
children would be a better decision than the sum of the choices
of individual parents who must give up other purchases to obtain
more expensive care for their children.
If the diagnosis is that government should seek to increase
the aggregate resources devoted to child care, many institutional
responses are justified. The range of responses includes tax
credits (incentives for parents to obtain more child care with
their own funds) and public provision through government-op-
erated or government-subsidized enterprises. Also included are
efforts to reduce the cost of certain factors needed for the
provision of child care. The government can supply free or
reduced-price space for child care centers, can provide funds
for training child care professionals, and can alter tort law with
the goal of reducing insurance premiums for child care facilities.
The overriding purpose of these varied steps is to obtain more
child care by lowering costs for one or more production factors,
so that current dollars will buy more care and lower prices will
lead individuals to purchase more of this good.
B. The Poor Should Be Able to Purchase More Child Care
A different justification for some government programs is that
many people do not have enough income to purchase as much
child care as would be good for them or for their children. A
number of welfare-redistribution programs focus on satisfying
particular needs with aid in kind rather than on supplying fun-
gible dollars to poor persons. Examples include food stamps, 9
government-paid medical care, public schools, and fuel assis-
tance. These programs have two goals: to focus government
funds on persons with low income who have special needs (e.g.,
only the person who is sick gets medical assistance); and to
attempt to skew the poor family's consumption patterns toward
the goals paternalistically sought by government (e.g., food
stamps cannot be spent on cigarettes, alcoholic beverages, or
imported food). Child care paid in full or part by government
9 On food stamps as an example of government providing means-tested certificates
that can be spent to purchase prescribed commodities, see Finegold, Agriculture and
the Politics of U.S. Social Provision: Social Insurance and Food Stamps, in THE
POLITICS OF SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 217-34 (M. Weir, A. Orloff & T.
Skocpol ed. 1988); M. MACDONALD, FOOD, STAMPS, AND INCOME MAINTENANCE 21-
48 (1977).
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meets both these goals: it provides no assistance to childless
poor families or to families that care for children at home;10 and
by paying only for the purchase of child care (often only child
care meeting specified standards), government encourages fam-
ilies to obtain that service.
It may be that proposals to finance child care, as seen in the
context of economic redistribution programs, raise questions
that no society likes to confront and that U.S. political institu-
tions positively recoil from addressing. What is the majority's
view about whether poor families should be economically en-
couraged or disencouraged to have children? Is it better if chil-
dren of the poor are cared for outside their parents' homes? Is
it important that single mothers work, even if child care costs
more than the parent's short-term earnings?"
C. Child Care Workers Should Earn Higher Salaries
Some advocates of new child care laws seek higher wages for
professional employees, arguing that these workers are under-
10 It may be difficult for government to distinguish between care purchased from
strangers, which should be subsidized with public funds, and care from family members,
which (according to the rationale for some programs) ought not receive public money.
See Miller v. Youakim, 440 U.S. 125 (1979) (Federal AFDC law requires Illinois to
make payments to relatives functioning as foster parents); Bowen v. Gilliard, 107 S.Ct.
3008 (1987) (not unconstitutional to make smaller AFDC payments on behalf of child in
household receiving money from absent parent).
" Should government offer subsidized child care to a poor single parent even if the
cost to taxpayers is greater than the amount the parent can earn in the time freed for
work? For the argument in favor, see L. MEAD, BEYOND ENTITLEMENT: THE SOCIAL
OBLIGATIONS OF CITIZENSHIP (1986). For the argument against, see Gramlich, The
Main Themes, in FIGHTING POVERTY: WHAT WORKS AND WHAT DOESN'T 346 (1986).
For further discussion of these arguments, see Sarvasy, Reagan and Low-Income
Mothers: A Feminist Recasting of the Debate, in REMAKING THE WELFARE STATE:
RETRENCHMENT AND SOCIAL POLICY IN AMERICA AND EUROPE 255 (M. Brown ed.
1988) [hereinafter REMAKING THE WELFARE STATE]:
[From the beginning of the AFDC program in 1935 through the Family Support
Act of 1988, there has been] tension between mothering and working ....
[S]ome progressive reformers advocated sending low-income mothers home to
care for their children. Yet in tension with the ideal of government-supported,
full-time mothering was the concern that mothers not be discouraged from
taking low-paying, traditional women's jobs, because somebody had to fill the
demand for that type of work.
See also Law, Women, Work, Welfare and the Preservation of Patriarchy, 131 U. PA.
L. REV. 1249 (1983). The Family Support Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-485, 102 Stat.
2343, is based on the assumption that single mothers should work and that government
should pay at least some of the costs of child care. The act requires states to set up Job
Opportunities and Basic Skills Programs (JOBS) for single parents of children over
three. It allows states to require participation of parents whose children are older than
one. But parental participation can be required only if child care is provided, and the
child care must be continued for one year after the parent finds a job and ceases to
receive AFDC.
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valued and undercompensated. Human services workers, who
are mainly women, do not receive the economic rewards of blue
collar workers, who are mainly men. In this form, the argument
for greater compensation for child care workers is a specific
example of the need for comparable worth legislation12 (or for
comparable worth interpretations of Title VII). 13 The issue of
workers' pay is relevant in considering which institutional forms
are best for expanded child care programs. For example, if the
government lowered the age at which children may attend public
schools, it is likely that professional child care workers would
be called teachers, would belong to teacher unions, and would
receive teachers' salaries.
Controversy over such issues arose when states expanded
public schooling to include kindergarten. The 1971 congressional
battle over the Comprehensive Child Development
Amendments 14 required compromises between teacher groups
seeking to expand their membership to include child care pro-
viders and community and parent groups seeking to avoid what
they saw as control by unresponsive professional educators and
school bureaucrats. In addition, those opposing control of child
care programs by the public schools sought to obtain more child
care with available funds than would be available if workers
received the higher salaries of teachers. Many legislative battles
over child care, in Washington and in the states, have been
replays of that disagreement.15 Proponents of higher salaries for
12 Canada and the European Community have enacted such laws. See Weiler, The
Wages of Sex: The Uses and Limits of Comparable Worth, 99 HARV. L. REv. 1728,
1769 n.160 (1986).
13 But see AFSCME v. State of Washington, 770 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1985) (employee's
"market-rate" explanation for paying women lower wages is a good defense to a Title
VII claim).
14 S. 2007, 92 Cong., 1st Sess., 117 CONG. REc. 45,612 (returned without approval by
President Nixon, Dec. 9, 1971).
"' Is child care education or merely custody? In Los Angeles County v. Kirk, 148
Cal. 385, 387, 83 P. 250, 251 (1905), the California Supreme Court ruled that kindergarten
classes for four- and five-year-olds were not part of the "system of common schools,"
apparently because at that age children were only playing, not learning. "It is apparent
that the work contemplated by such a system [kindergarten] is purely preliminary to,
and entirely different in character from the ordinary work of the common school."
Senator Kennedy's Smart Start proposal would commit the United States to an edu-
cational approach to children now referred to as "pre-schoolers." See Kennedy, A
Legislative Approach to Work and Family: Time for a Smart Start, 26 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 391 (1989). If the program is educational, the First Amendment may restrict
more severely its religious content and environment. See Boothby, The Establishment
and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment and Their Impact on National Child
Care Legislation, 26 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 549 (1989); Liekweg, Participation of Religious
Providers in Federal Child Care Legislation: Unrestricted Vouchers Are a Constitutional
Alternative, 26 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 565 (1989); Whitehead, Accommodation and Equal
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child care workers also contend that present compensation in-
dicates that a low value is placed on the service and results in
low professional quality.
D. The Quality of Child Care Services Should Be Higher
Goals of quality and quantity are sometimes in tension in the
child care debate. While some reforms seek mainly to expand
the amount of child care, others seek to impose minimum stan-
dards of quality. The strongest measure government can take is
to prohibit the use of child care unless it is of some minimum
quality. Building codes and housing codes declare that individ-
uals and families can only live in premises that meet a prescribed
standard of decency. The governments that enact (and some-
times enforce) housing codes usually do not provide funds with
which poor individuals can obtain code-complying housing.
Thus the code can be seen as a statement that persons unable
to afford decent housing are not wanted in that particular mu-
nicipality. Similarly, many communities set regulatory standards
for paid child care but offer no funds to working parents who
cannot afford child care that meets the legal standard. This
results in the purchase and sale of informal and sometimes
unlawful care.
E. Child Care Policies Should Promote Diversity
Because child care is consumed collectively, the diversity or
homogeneity of the student body is a relevant variable. Various
government child care programs can be evaluated for their im-
pact on the economic and racial composition of pupil popula-
tions. Sometimes subsidies for the children of better-off parents
are justified with the argument that the effect is to put those
children in child care facilities alongside the children of poorer
parents.
Treatment of Religion: Federal Funding of Religiously-Affiliated Child Care Facilities,
26 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 573 (1989).
1989]
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F. Parents Need Help in Borrowing Against Lifetime
Earnings to Pay for Child Care
Child care is needed for only part of the working life of
parents, usually a small part. Some proposed government inter-
ventions seek to make it easier for parents to allocate their
lifetime earnings so that child care can be purchased with less
financial strain. Some subsidies for care of the children of AFDC
recipients are supported with the argument that the short-term
inefficiency (child care may cost more than the low-wage par-
ent's earnings in the labor force) is justified because it increases
the likelihood that the parent will work later rather than receive
welfare. 16
G. Government Support for Child Care Will Help Women
Since mothers usually become child care providers when
other arrangements are too expensive, the current system re-
stricts employment opportunities for both married and unmar-
ried mothers, thus perpetuating labor market inequality between
men and women. It is a strong argument for government-assisted
child care expenditures that in fact such subsidies increase ca-
reer opportunities for women.
17
H. Income Tax Treatment of Child Care Costs Should Be
Altered to Make the Tax System Fairer
It is sometimes argued that a fair and efficient income tax
system would allow a deduction or a credit for funds spent to
obtain child care. If a parent cares for children at home, no tax
is levied on the imputed value of the service. 8 Putting the same
point in another way, the second parent who joins the labor
force only assists the family economically by the wage earned
minus the cost of child care.
16 See L. MEAD, supra note 11.
17 Victor Fuchs uses game theory to derive his conclusion that since "women's
concern for children is, on average, greater than men's .... child allowances or child
care subsidies help women, regardless of marital status." V. FucHs, supra note 8, at
71.
18 See, e.g., Wolfman, Childcare, Work and the Federal Income Tax, 3 AM. J. TAX.
POL'Y 153, 167 (1984).
Evaluating Child Care Legislation
I. Information About Child Care Is a Public Good, and
Should Be Provided by Government
Government may be an efficient collector and provider of
information and advice about child care. Many states operate
child care information and referral programs. These are an in-
expensive way for government to "do something about" the
child care problem.
J. Child Care Policies Should Pursue Population Goals
Some countries have explicit population policies that are then
reflected in child care programs. For example, China has sought
to use economic incentives to encourage compliance with its
one-child policy. Urban parents receive free child care if they
have one child. If they have more than one, they must pay
onerous child care fees for all their children, including the first.
In the United States public discourse rarely proceeds from
arguments that the government should encourage parents to
have more or fewer children. However, it is sometimes argued
that those opposed to abortion should favor expanded public
programs to assist parents in caring for children.19
II. PROGRAM OPTIONS
Supporters of government intervention "for child care" seek
various goals. Program choices should depend on the priority
given to the different ends being sought.
A. Direct Government Provision of Child Care
Government can buy or rent space and operate child care
facilities. Child care could be a service like police protection,
or education in kindergarten or the first grade. In American
society, the following consequences seem likely to result from
following such a policy:
19 See, e.g., M. GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW 53-57 (1987).
19891
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Employees would be protected by fourteenth amendment due
process,20 by civil service, and by public-sector collective bar-
gaining statutes. The likelihood of their choosing to be union
members would be vastly greater than is the case for employees
of for-profit or not-for-profit child care centers. Thus wages and
conditions for employees would probably be substantially
higher.
Government would feel pressure to operate facilities that meet
at least a minimal standard. It is true that some operations of
state and local government are not conducted in a fancy way
(compare a public sector to a private sector law office), but
government is susceptible to embarrassing publicity when un-
fortunate consequences occur to persons for whom it has as-
sumed a responsibility of care.21 Certainly one could expect
child care to include different services if government provided
care directly than if individuals purchase child care using their
own (even if tax-subsidized) funds. 22
Government would need to decide who is eligible to use the
child care facilities if fewer services were provided than maxi-
mum demand. One can speculate about whether government
would assign limited spaces to those most in need (recognizing
that more than one definition of need is possible), to those with
political connections, 23 or to those satisfying some programmatic
goal such as economic and racial integration. Provision by gov-
20 Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982), held that fourteenth amendment
limitations do not apply to a private social service agency receiving virtually all its funds
from the state. Thus the fourteenth amendment is relevant only if government delivers
the service directly.
21 Even exposes of scandalous conditions in prisons and mental hospitals support this
point. Bad conditions "at home" command less attention, and do not focus attention on
a public agency obliged to respond. In addition, government's liability in tort is very
different depending on whether a public agency has custody of the child. Compare
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Services, 109 S.Ct. 998 (1989) (no
federal constitutional duty on state to protect child from abusing father) with City of
Canton v. Harris, 57 U.S.L.W. 4270 (U.S. Feb. 28, 1989) (municipal liability for mis-
treatment of person in custody if city failed to properly train police officers).
22 On other differences between government provision of service and government
purchase from not-for-profit providers, see N. GILBERT, CAPITALISM AND THE WEL-
FARE STATE: DILEMMAS OF SOCIAL BENEVOLENCE 5-20 (1983). On differences between
political and economic arrangements for aggregating decisions, see D. MUELLER, PUBLIC
CHOICE (1979); D. WEIMER & A. VINING, POLICY ANALYSIS: CONCEPTS AND PRACTICE
(1989).
21 There would be some constitutional limits on this form of political patronage. See,
e.g., Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347 (1976) (county sheriff who replaced non-civil-service
employees with members of his own party violated First Amendment); Branti v. Finkel,
445 U.S. 507 (1980) (discharging public defenders because of their lack of membership
in a particular party violated associational rights).
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ernment might lead to pressure for expansion of service so that
all those meeting some eligibility test could be served.
Government could charge fees. No one can ride the subway
or cross a toll bridge without paying.24 Probably government
would feel compelled to arrange a pricing structure that adjusted
fees according to parental capacity to pay. For all parent income
levels above the poorest, price-setting would be complicated
and controversial. 25
If the service were supplied at no fee or if there were below-
cost fees to some or all users, government would have to choose
a revenue-raising device, such as general public revenues or a
special tax. If, for example, employers were taxed, important
issues would be raised that now arise in the context of manda-
tory employer-paid health insurance.
26
B. Government Payment of Some or All the Costs
One outcome of the Great Society was the creation of a vast
network of social services, funded by the federal government
but supplied by private (usually non-profit) agencies. 27 The gaps
caused by the Reagan Administration's cutbacks in these ser-
vices were filled from the then-growing coffers of state govern-
ment. 28 More federal and state social services money is now
spent on child care than on any other service.
24 Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971), held government must waive the fee
for a divorce for persons who cannot afford to pay. However, Boddie has not been
applied to other "necessary" government services. See, e.g., U.S. v. Kras, 409 U.S.
371 (1973) (upholding state filing fee requirement for judicial discharge in bankruptcy);
Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656 (1973) (per curiam) (upholding filing fee requirement
for appellate court review of welfare reductions).
2 On fee schedules in social services programs, see N. GILBERT, supra note 22, at
75-85.
26 For a discussion of the disadvantages of charging employers for the cost of em-
ployee health care, see Liebman, Too Much Information: Predictions of Employee
Disease and the Fringe Benefit System, 1988 U. CHI. LEGAL FORUM 57, 86-87.
2 The trigger was the 1967 amendments to the Social Security Act, Pub. L. No. 90-
248, 81 Stat. 821 (1967) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). For a discussion
of this story, see M. DERTHICK, UNCONTROLLABLE SPENDING FOR SOCIAL SERVICES
GRANTS (1975); N. GILBERT, supra note 22, at 63-66; Smith & Stone, The Unexpected
Consequences of Privatization, in REMAKING THE WELFARE STATE, supra note 11, at
232.
28 For the argument that states did not replace all the Reagan reductions, see M.
KIMMICH, AMERICA'S CHILDREN, WHO CARES?: GROWING NEEDS AND DECLINING
ASSISTANCE IN THE REAGAN ERA (1985).
1989]
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In 1971, President Nixon successfully vetoed the only com-
prehensive child care legislation Congress has ever adopted.29
Thus the United States failed to enact a right to child care or
even a single national program to finance this service. But the
Nixon view-that federally-funded child care would corrupt the
moral fabric of the country by undermining traditional family
values30 -did not prevail. Instead, those who sought financial
assistance for child care and those in the business of supplying
it achieved appropriations that soon grew beyond even what
would have been authorized by the 1971 bill. However, the new
money was spent through several programs instead of one and
with no comprehensive strategy or coherent rules of entitlement.
That is the current American scheme: the federal government
spends about $2.9 billion in direct child care expenditures.3 If,
for example, the median expenditure per child who benefits from
federal funds is $1500, then approximately 1.9 million children
receive some type of federal child care support. This is less than
one fifth of the 10.6 million preschool children in families with
no stay-at-home parent, but if the funds went only to children
in poor families, the number benefitted could be sixty percent
of the 3.8 million children with no stay-at-home parent in fam-
ilies with incomes below $25,000.32
Summarizing current arrangements is difficult because state
programs vary widely, but some general statements can be
made:
First, entitlement bears little relation to income or wealth.
Many families are helped who are economically better off than
some denied help. However, sliding fee scales are common, so
those who are helped often pay part of the cost. Different pro-
grams have different fee formulas.
Second, selection of children (or, more likely, of parents) to
receive this substantial and important benefit is often decen-
tralized to a low level. Thus political subdivisions or even neigh-
borhoods may have an allocation, and local rules or politics
govern selection.
29 S. 2007, 92 Cong., 1st Sess. (returned without approval by President Nixon, Dec.
9, 1971).
30 See infra note 63 and accompanying text.
31 A WORKFORCE ISSUE, supra note 4, at 17. This is in addition to $4 billion in federal
income taxes that government foregoes through the Child Care and Dependent Tax
Credit. See Besharov, Fixing the Child Care Credit: Hidden Policies Lead to Regressive
Policies, 26 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 505, at n.32.
32 A WORKFORCE ISSUE, supra note 4, at 149-50.
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Third, program goals reflected in child selection also vary.
Racial and economic integration is sometimes pursued and
sometimes not.
Is this a bad system? Discretionary authority to select recip-
ients of such a large benefit is power. That power can be used
to cement communities, to influence behavior in socially desir-
able ways, and to favor those in need according to criteria more
sophisticated than those measurable by arbitrary rules. It can
also be used to prefer those of a certain race or religion, to
coerce political support, and to deter unconventional thought
and action.
A separate question is whether it is acceptable to pay with
public funds for a small percentage of a service needed, desired,
and arguably deserved by many more. 33 Would it be better to
choose between subsidizing all child care and paying for none?
If there is to be subsidization for some of those who would like
it, ought there to be coherent and defensible rules directing the
selection: national rules that all of a certain income are entitled,
and that all those with a certain income should receive a given
amount or percentage of subsidy?
Even in a scheme where public funds were provided for the
purchase of child care to the economically neediest families, so
that the program coherently pursued expenditure-targeted in-
come redistribution, it would be necessary to consider problems
that have been presented by other non-cash transfers to the
poor (such as food stamps, energy assistance, and Medicaid).
One common problem with non-cash transfers is that sometimes
the right to payment can be turned into cash, defeating govern-
ment's attempt to limit the ways in which the money can be
spent. This problem is frequently observed in literature about
the food stamp program.34 Presumably it would rarely be true
of child care payments because the holder of a voucher would
not have an easy time transferring it to another user for cash.
Using tax credits to assist parents who purchase child care poses
the problem that some claim the credit without purchasing any
child care.35 Recently the law was changed to require those
13 For analysis of the extent to which various programs serving children are funded
at far lower levels than would be needed to serve all who are eligible, see CHILDREN'S
DEFENSE FUND, CHILDREN'S DEFENSE BUDGET: FY 1989: AN ANALYSIS OF OUR
NATION'S INVESTMENTS IN CHILDREN (1988).
34 See supra note 9.
35 See Besl~arov, supra note 31, at 505 nn.37-38.
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claiming the credit to identify the Social Security number of the
payee,3 6 suggesting that the government believed that some pro-
viders did not declare child care fees as income.
Sometimes, targeted government payments may result in inef-
ficiency since consumers may have inadequate capacity to as-
sure quality37 and little incentive to restrict quantity.38 The first
of these should not be the situation for child care; most parents
will care about the quality of child care even if they are not
paying for it. A harder question is whether free care for children
of poor parents would cause the purchase of too much child
care.39 Sometimes, especially where a single parent has two or
more preschool children, child care costs significantly more than
the parent can currently earn in the labor market (especially
taking account of work expenses). Provision of child care is
justified in such cases on a theory that current parental work
will make long-term work more likely, on a theory that the
society wants that parent working even at net cost to taxpayers,
or on a theory that it is fair that the parent have the option of
working.
40
Another problem with non-universal programs is that the pro-
gram may lose broad support because only the poor benefit, and
may not be ideal because it groups poor recipients together
rather than integrating economic classes. These are real risks
for a means-tested child care program.
C. Subsidization Through the Income Tax System
Government subsidization through tax expenditures imposes
the least amount of public constraint on the nature of the ser-
36 See I.R.C. § 21(e)(9) (West Supp. 1988).
37 This may be true as to nursing home conditions for residents without observant
younger family members.
mA standard observation by analysts of the American health-finance system is that
consumers who are fully protected (by employer-paid insurance, by Medicaid, or by
Medicare) seek and receive more care than they would purchase if they had to pay for
it themselves. See, e.g., Newhouse, Manning, Morris, et al., Some Interim Results
from a Controlled Trial of Cost Sharing in Health Insurance, 305 NEw ENO. J. OF
MED. 1501 (1981); Brook, Ware, Rogers, et al., Does Free Care Improve Adults' Health:
Results from a Randomized Controlled Trial, 309 NEw ENG. J. OF MED. 1426 (1983).
39 This only makes the point that it is difficult for a society to determine exactly how
much child care should be consumed. This Article explores the view (widely held right
now) that current markets plus the current income distribution result in the purchase of
too little child care. It is entirely possible that subsidies and other government inter-
ventions could lead to results that some would consider the purchase of too much child
care.
40 See L. MEAD, supra note 11.
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vice. Parents choose a facility and pay the charges; government
is involved only in accepting a smaller tax obligation. Govern-
ment must still make some decisions: Is care by a relative
covered? Will the benefit be provided if care is in a religious
facility? Will the benefit be allowed if care is in an unlicensed
facility? However, as is appropriate for an arrangement using
the tax code, the major decisions will be financial: How many
tax dollars will be forsworn for parents of what income? Will
the benefit be a deduction, giving additional aid to persons in
higher brackets, or a credit, thus not varying with the bracket
of the taxpayer? Will it be refundable, authorizing a government
payment if its effect is to reduce the parents' tax liability below
zero?
D. Licensing
Government can seek to prevent paid child care from being
used unless the program meets regulatory standards. 41 Many
jurisdictions license child care providers. 42 It is relatively easy
to make use of a licensed facility a condition for receipt of
government subsidy funds. It is far more difficult to enforce a
rule that a parent ought not to leave a child with an unlicensed
paid provider. Certainly, government's inhibitions in enforcing
this norm are similar to those that keep it from closing non-code
complying housing. By new statutory provision, the federal gov-
ernment requires those using the child care income tax credit
to identify those paid to provide care, thus assisting federal
enforcement of the duty of providers to declare fees as income. 43
It is an interesting question whether the credit should be denied
for child care provided in a facility that does not meet local or
state licensing requirements. 44
4, See Pre-School Owners Assn. v. Dep't of Children and Family Services, 119 III.
2d 268, 518 N.E.2d 1018 (1988) (rejecting constitutional challenges to provisions ex-
empting some child care arrangements from the state's regulatory requirements).
42 See, e.g., Mass. Regs. Code tit. 102, § 7.00 (1987) (Standards for the Licensure of
Group Day Care Centers); id. § 8.00 (1989) (Family Day Care Homes). On regulation
by states generally, see A WORKFORCE ISSUE, supra note 4, at 171-80.
41 I.R.C. § 21(e)(9) (West Supp. 1988). Some Republicans would exempt small-scale
child care providers from taxation on some of their earnings. See S. 2084, 100th Cong.,
2d Sess. § 403, 134 CONG. REc. S1,423 (daily ed. Feb. 25, 1988).
'The insurance requirement is an especially interesting licensing condition. Insurance
premiums for the risk of child abuse are very high. Should government seek to prevent
parents from using a facility without such insurance, even if the result is that there will
be no facility certain parents can afford to use? Senator Hatch would expand support
of child care by changing the tort system to make it harder to win a suit for child abuse
against a child care provider. See S. 2084, at §§ 201-209.
1989]
Harvard Journal on Legislation [Vol. 26:357
What is the justification for a government intervention that
declares minimum standards but does not provide the funds to
make that standard affordable for all? The declaration of stan-
dards may inform parents of what the society believes children
should have. Some who can afford the regulatory norm may
obey it who would not do so if there were no rule. There are
significant costs to declaring unenforced standards: underground
transactions are encouraged; poor families feel inadequate;
some desirable arrangements are not made; respect for govern-
ment regulations diminishes. Yet it is easy to understand why
government will continue to declare norms: doing so is an in-
expensive way to appear to take action about a recognized
problem; it responds to the periodic scandal about bad facilities
or facilities where unfortunate accidents occur; provider groups
press for existing programs to be better funded; parents whose
children are now in day care are more effective politically than
parents whose children would have spaces if funds were spread
more widely.
It is of course possible to argue that minimum standards for
child care should be enforced rigorously and not merely de-
clared. Sub-minimum conditions endanger children, and cer-
tainly do not maximize children's potential. 45 Imagine a com-
munity that succeeded in preventing children from being placed
anywhere not complying with the child care code and also pre-
vented them from being left at home alone. This community
would keep a parent at home unless the family obtained ade-
quate alternative care. Presumably, corollaries of such a policy
would be adequate cash assistance to pay for child care and a
rule that government would not impose work requirements on
parents (as 'a condition of income transfer eligibility) unless it
made available satisfactory child care. 46 That is a coherent pol-
4 Several studies suggest that quality child care can have a positive effect on edu-
cationally disadvantaged children. See, e.g., L. SCHWEINHART & E. MAZUR, PREKIN-
DERGARTEN PROGRAMS IN URBAN SCHOOLS (1987); J. LALLY, THE SYRACUSE UNIVER-
SITY FAMILY DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH PROGRAM: LONG-RANGE IMPACT OF AN EARLY
INTERVENTION WITH LOW-INCOME CHILDREN AND THEIR FAMILIES (1987); I. LAZAR
& R. )ARLINGTON, LASTING EFFECTS OF EARLY EDUCATION: A REPORT FROM THE
CONSORTIUM FOR LONGITUDINAL STUDIES (1982). See also Kennedy, supra note 15.
46 The Family Support Act of 1988 requires any state agency which institutes a
program for job opportunities and basic skills training ("workfare") to:
(A) provide (directly or through arrangements with others) information on the
types and locations of child care services reasonably accessible to participants
in the program, CB) inform participants that assistance is available to help them
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icy, albeit difficult to enforce. One argument against such a rule
would be that parents have a liberty interest in placing their
children in sub-minimum child care so that the parents can
pursue work or other activities. Another argument against it
would be that in American society today, such a rule would
deny career opportunities disproportionately to female parents.
But it is possible that society over time could create a wide-
spread (and perhaps even a legally enforced) understanding that
a consequence of becoming a parent is the responsibility to take
satisfactory care of children until they reach the age at which
the state provides free schooling. 47
E. Loans
Government could play a much larger role than it currently
does in assisting families to manage the special short-term cash
need that child care imposes. Child care is required at a time
when many parents are on the upward slope of their income
curve, and when they may well be "house poor." If schooling
is to be free from kindergarten to grade twelve, and subsidized
in many ways (including state college systems and subsidized
federal loans) for college and even graduate school, why should
only pre-kindergarten education be fully charged to parents? If
it is, then it is a short-term expense that many parents will seek
to amortize over some longer period of parenthood. Government
has made money available on easy terms to allow college ex-
penses to be paid over the student's worklife; it could do the
same for child care expenses.
F. Government Planning
Government can undertake to pursue coordination and co-
herence in a web of child care systems which currently has
major gaps and overlaps. It can also undertake to assemble
select appropriate child care services, and (C) on request, provide assistance
to participants in obtaining child care services.
Family Support Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-485, 102 Stat. 2343, § 201 (amending
§ 402(a)(19) of the Social Security Act).
47 The Family Support Act takes a small step in that direction with its attempts to
impose bureaucratically enforcible financial responsibility on absent fathers. Family
Support Act of 1988, §§ 101-129.
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information for parents who must make choices about care of
their children.
48
G. Government Attempts to Increase Supply
Government makes some programmatic interventions in the
child care system with the goal of expanding supply. Govern-
ment sometimes supports the training of child care personnel.
Sometimes it gives real estate tax or zoning advantages to de-
velopers who include child care facilities in their projects, pre-
sumably at less return than the alternative rental value of the
space.49 The specific consequences of these public efforts are
hard to gauge. How much child care benefit is obtained for each
dollar of expended or forgone government funds? And if more
child care is supplied, who gets it? These interventions may
expand service, but the added spaces may be used by persons
like those who obtain care in an unregulated market. Supply-
expanding efforts are probably sensible only if government has
decided that all increases in child care are desirable, no matter
who the users are; or if government sees disadvantages to in-
terventions that implicate the public sector more directly; or if
government seeks to encourage particular care arrangements
closely related to the particular expansions of supply that are
encouraged. Examples of the last point include training teachers
who will use some favored educational method or giving real
estate tax benefits for on-site care (sensible only if a decision
has been made that on-site care should be preferred to other
locations).
H. Mandates on Employers or Landlords
Government can tell someone else to pay for child care. One
candidate is employers. Some fringe benefits are mandated. 50
43 Regarding information and referral programs operated by business, see S. KAMER-
MAN & A. KAHN, THE RESPONSIVE WORKPLACE: EMPLOYERS AND A CHANGING LABOR
FORCE 204-07 (1987).
4 See Note, Child Care Linkage: Addressing Child Care Needs Through Land Use
Planning, 26 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 591 (1989).
'0 For example, employers are required by federal law to pay taxes that establish
worker participation in the Social Security system (retirement, disability, and Medicare
benefits). See 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-433 (1982). Every state requires participation in a
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Health insurance is usually not required, 51 but conditions are
imposed when an employer chooses (often influenced by the tax
advantages) to provide this benefit.5 2 Government could say that
employers must provide child care at the worksite, or must pay
for some or all of it wherever it is obtained.5 3
The issue of whether employee compensation should be based
on contribution or need is an old subject, sometimes addressed
with the concept of the social wage.5 4 One way to explore the
issue in the child care context is to ask whether wages should
be higher by a set amount for parents of children between birth
and age five. (This seems much like a children's allowance, but
only for workers and charged to employers.) The program would
be more focused if, for example, it required payments only to
parents who use paid child care and obtain it from a licensed
provider. How is this different from requiring employers to pay
health expenses? It is only different if the need for child care is
more predictable and controllable than the need for medical
services, thus increasing fears of employer discrimination
among job applicants.5 5 Such discrimination in employment can
be made unlawful more easily than it can be prevented. Stated
another way, workers are mobile and the need for child care
Worker's Compensation program for workplace injuries. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE.
§ 3600 (West 1971). Federal law creates incentives to which every state has responded
by enacting an Unemployment Insurance system. 42 U.S.C. §§ 501-504 (1982); I.R.C.
§§ 3301-3311 (1982); see, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 151A (West 1982).
51 Hawaii was the first state to take legislative steps toward compulsory benefits. See
Hawaii Prepaid Health Care Act, HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 393-1 to -51 (1988). The
Hawaiian law was held to be preempted by ERISA, the federal law regulating fringe
benefits, in Standard Oil Co. of California v. Agsalud, 442 F. Supp. 695 (N.D. Calif.
1977), aff'd, 633 F.2d 760 (9th Cir. 1980), aff'd, 454 U.S. 801 (1981), and then Congress
gave the Hawaiian program a special exemption from ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(5)
(1982). Washington and Massachusetts have also enacted legislation establishing com-
pulsory benefits. See WASH. REv. CODE ANN. ch. 48.41 (1989); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. Ch. 118F (West 1989).
52 See, e.g., Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724 (1985)
(federal law does not preempt a Massachusetts requirement that health insurance pro-
grams provide specific minimum mental health benefits).
51 It has been argued that employer expenditures on child care lead to higher profits.
See, e.g., J. FERNANDEZ, CHILD CARE AND CORPORATE PRODUCTIVITY: RESOLVING
FAMILY/WoRK CONFLICTS (1986). It is more difficult to argue that government would
do a better job than business of evaluating the effect of child care on business
profitability.
54 On "the notion of a social wage as an alternative and supplement to a market wage,"
see Brown, Remaking the Welfare State: A Comparative Perspective, in REMAKING
THE WELFARE STATE, supra note 11, at 25 n.5. See also Liebman, supra note 26, at 86
n.112, and works cited therein.
55 Liebman, supra note 26, at 84-89.
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can be predicted and planned. Thus it may seem wrong to charge
such a large expense to the company that employs a parent
during the child-care years. (Similar arguments are relevant to
decisions about pregnancy costs, including parental leave.) On
the other hand, the sense that the parent's job creates the need
for child care is stronger than the feeling of employer respon-
sibility for non-work caused illness.
56
There are also various insurance alternatives. The company
pays a percentage of its payroll as a fee, and the insurance
company pays child care costs when individual workers con-
sume the service.5 7 (Is this a better arrangement than providing
capital so that the parents can borrow the money, buy the
service, and repay the loan over an extended period?)
Finally, a long-term alteration of our system to one in which
employers provide or pay for child care would be another major
step toward employer involvement in the lives of workers, re-
versing a twentieth-century development that emphasizes lib-
erty and independence. 58 The price of employer responsibility
for so many of the important and intimate aspects of employee
life would be high. And, as compared to seeing child care as a
responsibility of government, employer obligation would sepa-
rate workers according to their employers (as happens vis-i-vis
medical care), thus preserving hierarchies of entitlement and
discriminations of service quality. 9
A different approach is real estate "linkage": awarding zoning
permission for new office buildings only to projects that contain
child care facilities.60 These programs expand the supply of child
care by spending funds that are public in the sense that society
ultimately pays (the space could contain offices or the building
could be smaller and impose less congestion on the city) and in
the additional sense that if government is selling development
rights, it could tax the developer for housing or parks or edu-
cation or income support for the poor instead of for child care.
They are not public funds, or not fungible public funds, to the
56 On employer response to the fact that some women must balance careers with
parental responsibilities, see Schwartz, Management Women and the New Facts of
Life, HARv. Bus. REv. Jan.-Feb. 1989, at 65.
57 Employer-financed insurance of nursing home care is now under discussion at many
companies.
58 Liebman, supra note 26, at 59 n.2.
59 See V. FuCHS, supra note 8, at 136-37, discussing the inefficiency and inequity of
imposing child care costs on business according to the number of employees who ate
parents.
6 See Note, supra note 49.
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extent that arbitrary constitutional restrictions 61 might allow this
imposition to be put on a developer but disallow other taxes.
In any event, the goal is more child care. This device for
expanding expenditure on child care also has predictable con-
sequences. "Linkage" programs prefer child care at the office-
site, child care facilities populated with children of co-workers,
child care in expensive space, and an expansion in child care
that benefits an arbitrarily selected subset of all those who would
prefer an employer payment toward the care of their children.
III. PENDING PROPOSALS: PREDICTING THEIR CONSEQUENCES
A. The 1971 Comprehensive Child Development Program
The modern context for federal child care legislation was set
in 1971 when both houses of Congress adopted the Comprehen-
sive Child Development Amendments62 to the Economic Op-
portunity Act. The Nixon Administration, through its Secretary
of Health, Education, and Welfare, Elliot Richardson, had par-
ticipated in drafting this bill, but by the time it reached the
President's desk, the political environment was dominated by
conservative reaction to the Nixon-Kissinger opening to China.
Mr. Nixon needed to make a conservative gesture, which he
did by vetoing S. 2007, his veto message accusing the bill of
"family weakening implications," and saying it would be "a long
leap into the dark for the United States Government and the
American people." Mr. Nixon characterized the bill as "the most
radical piece of legislation to emerge from the Ninety-second
Congress." Instead of committing "the vast moral authority of
the National Government to the side of communal approaches
to child rearing over against the family-centered approach," Mr.
Nixon called for programs "consciously designed to cement the
6" After Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987), it is uncertain
whether San Francisco's program requiring office developers either to include a child
care facility or to pay into a city-wide child care fund is constitutional. See Note, supra
note 49, at 625-30 nn.149-76.
62 S. 2007, 92 Cong., Ist Sess., 117 CONG. REC. 45,612 (returned without approval by
President Nixon, Dec. 9, 1971).
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family in its rightful position as the keystone of our
civilization.
63
Substantively, the Comprehensive Child Development bill
was in most ways the parent of the 1988 and 1989 versions of
the Act for Better Child Care. It rejected expanding public
school education to provide for younger children. 4 Rather, the
federal law would have blessed, in somewhat imprecise lan-
guage, new community institutions generally modelled on the
successful Mississippi Head Start program.6 5 Local disputes
over control of federal child care funds would have been re-
solved by the Secretary of HEW, under his authority to desig-
nate "prime sponsors," 66 of which there might have been
40,000.67 The bill also would have mandated state standard-
setting, coordinating, and regulatory functions.
The bill would not have established a right to subsidized child
care for any particular child or family.6 Rather, it would have
made a legislative declaration of the appropriateness of public
61 President's Message to the Senate Returning S. 2007 Without His Approval, 7
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Docs. 1634-36 (Dec. 9, 1971). The story of the 1971 veto is told
in G. STEINER, THE CHILDREN'S CAUSE 113-16 (1976). For a less rhetorical statement
of the arguments made in the Nixon veto message, see N. GILBERT, supra note 22, at
98:
Critics of day-care services that facilitate the trend toward two career families
are skeptical about the economic benefits that result after the costs of day care,
work-related expenses, taxes, and the loss of leisure time are subtracted from
the wife's earnings. As for the social consequences, they take a dim view of
the notion that the less time working parents spend with their children somehow
invests the experience with a "higher quality." There is also concern that as
the use of day-care centers increases, a large measure of the traditional re-
sponsibility for socialization in the decisive years of early childhood will shift
from the family to agencies of the state or private sector. Finally, and most
important, day-care adversaries fear that by reducing the degree of social and
economic interdependence among family members, day-care provisions would
also scrape away at some of the basic adhesion of family life.
6This was the period of battles over "community control" in such contexts as school
decentralization and the Model Cities Program. See, e.g., C. HAAR, BETWEEN THE
IDEA AND THE REALITY: A STUDY IN THE ORIGIN, FATE, AND LEGACY OF THE MODEL
CITIES PROGRAM (1975); D. RAVITCH, THE GREAT SCHOOL WARS, NEW YORK CITY
1805 - 1973: A HISTORY OF THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS As BATTLEFIELD OF SOCIAL CHANGE
(1974); Liebman, Social Intervention in a Democracy, 34 PUB. INT. 14 (1974). This issue
was alive as late as 1980, when supporters of Head Start successfully opposed transfer
of the program to the new U.S. Department of Education. Marian Wright Edelman is
quoted to this effect in Tompkins, Profiles: A Sense of Urgency, NEW YORKER, March
27, 1989, at 48, 68-69.
61 On the birth and life of the Head Start program, see Miller, Head Start: A Moving
Target, 5 YALE L. & POL'Y REy. 332 (1987).
66 S. 2007, at § 513(a).
67 G. STEINER, supra note 63, at 111.
68 Specified percentages of the total appropriation were to go to the children of migrant
farmers and Native American children. S. 2007, at §§ 503(b)(1)(A)-(B).
Evaluating Child Care Legislation
funding for this purpose, while providing funds for between five
and ten percent of all those declared to be legitimate recipients.
The bill would only have authorized expenditure of $2 billion
per year, and the assumption was that early-year appropriations
would be substantially smaller. There was a budget "crisis" then,
as there has always been. Estimates of legitimate need were
then (as now) uncertain, but $20 billion in 1971 dollars might
have been a median estimate. Some states would have supple-
mented the federal expenditures.
The Comprehensive Child Development bill died when the
Nixon veto was not overridden. Thus, the U.S. never enacted
comprehensive child care legislation, instead appropriating
funds through various programmatic structures that operated
very much as the 1971 law would have. Before long, federal
appropriations for this purpose were in the vicinity of $2 billion,
the number used in 1971 that has become the talismanic figure
in 1988 and 1989. Much child care was subsidized through pro-
visions of the Social Security Act,69 which were then folded into
the Social Services Block Grant in the first Reagan budget.70 It
is uncertain how much of the federal block grant money goes
to child care, but one estimate is that there is about $726 million
that does so. 71 State programs vary, as do state financial com-
mitments, but there is a program in every state, the care is
obtained from appropriate (meaning licensed) providers, and
local bureaucratic rules and political tussles select recipients
from among those eligible.
Meanwhile, an entirely separate approach-tax credits-now
provides $4 billion more in federal financial assistance for child
care. The Child and Dependent Care Tax Credit awards a thirty
percent non-refundable credit to families with incomes under
$10,000. This credit declines on a sliding scale to twenty percent
for families with incomes above $28,000.72 The distributional
consequences of these provisions are discussed by Douglas Be-
69 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2931-2933, originally enacted as Pub. L. No. 88-452, Title
V, § 581, 81 Stat. 713 (1967), repealed in 1981 by Pub. L. No. 97-35, Title VI, § 683(a),
95 Stat. 519 (1981). For the story of child care as part of the Social Security Act, see
M. DERTHICK, supra note 27, at 1-14; N. GILBERT, supra note 22, at 61.
70 The Social Services Block Grant, now 42 U.S.C. §§ 1397-1397(f), was created as
part of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, Title XXIII,
§ 2351, 95 Stat. 867 (1981).
71 A WORKFORCE ISSUE, supra note 4, at 31.
72 I.R.C. § 21(a)(2) (West Supp. 1988).
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sharov in this issue.73 By Mr. Besharov's calculation, this pro-
vision benefits 9.6 million families at an average of $419. Only
thirteen percent of the foregone federal taxes go to families with
incomes below $15,000, and about half go to families with in-
comes above the national median. In addition, more and more
employers are permitting Dependent Care Services Tax
Credits74 (popularly known as Flexible Spending Accounts),
which are opportunities for families to pay for child care with
pre-tax income. Overwhelmingly, this tax opportunity is used
by well-off families.
B. The Act for Better Child Care Services
The contemporary child of the 1971 Comprehensive Child
Development bill is the Act for Better Child Care (known as the
"ABC" bill),75 supported in 1988 and 1989 by a broad coalition
with Senator Christopher Dodd (D-Conn.) as the named leader.
Governor Dukakis supported the ABC bill in his 1988 presiden-
tial campaign.
The 1989 version of ABC would authorize Congress to appro-
priate up to $2.5 billion per year for all the purposes identified
in the act.76 Specified percentages of the total appropriated funds
would be set aside for territories and Indian tribes. 77 The re-
mainder would be allocated among the states according to a
complicated formula taking account of the state's number of
children and number of poor children. 78 The state would then
create an agency to administer the funds provided to it. States
would be required to meet minimum national quality standards .79
A committee named pursuant to the statute would establish the
minimum national standards, including staff-child ratios for chil-
dren of various ages. 80 The Secretary of Health and Human
71 Besharov, supra note 31, at 505; see also Robins, Federal Support for Child Care:
Current Policies and a Proposed New System, 11(2) Focus 1 (1988); Wolfman, supra
note 18.
71 I.R.C. § 129 (West Supp. 1988).
75 S. 1885, 100th Cong., lst., Sess., 133 CoNG. REc. S16,555 (daily ed. Nov. 19,
1987); S. 5, 101st Cong., Ist Sess., 135 CoNG. REc. S167 (daily ed. Jan. 25, 1989).
76 S. 5, at § 4(a).
'n S. 5, at § 5(a).
78 S. 5, at § 5(b).
79 S. 5, at § 7(c)(3)(C).
90 S. 5, at § 18.
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Services (HHS) would be allowed to strengthen but not to
weaken the standards recommended to him. Most of the state's
money would be used to provide child care for children in
families with no more than 100% of the state's median income. 81
The state would use a sliding scale to allocate its subsidies, thus
giving more to the poorest families.8 2 It would do its subsidiza-
tion by direct subsidy to qualified provider institutions or by
assigning child care certificates to families or by a combination
of the two approaches.
The ABC bill declares priorities among applicant families that
might well be in conflict: on the one hand, "priority to children
*.. with very low income," and on the other hand, priority to
child care providers which "to the maximum extent feasible,
provide child care services to a reasonable mix of children...
from different socio-economic backgrounds. 8 3 The bill seeks to
encourage higher salaries for child care workers: "exceptionally
low salaries . . . adversely affect the quality of child care ser-
vices by making it difficult to retain qualified staff."' 4 States
must make sure that care is provided for hours and days ade-
quate to full-time workers. 85 They must also allocate some of
their funds to provide care for parents who work nontraditional
hours (such as nights and weekends),8 6 and to make child care
available for children with handicaps. 87
Thus this proposed legislation would be a step toward ex-
panding the state and federal role as standard-setter and infor-
mation-coordinator; would require greater enforcement of licen-
sing requirements than is done presently; would put additional
government authority behind the appropriateness of child care
in high quality (therefore expensive) settings; and would declare
millions of families to be eligible for government financial help
toward child care costs, while authorizing only enough federal
money to provide the necessary assistance to a small percentage
of those eligible. Finally, the bill would provide little guidance
"I In the 1988 version of ABC the upper limit was 115% of the state median income.
In Massachusetts the figure would have been $44,941. See Besharov, supra note 31, at
505, n.56.
82 S. 5, at § 7(c)(10).
83 S. 5, at § 7(c)(9).
?A S. 5, at § 2(a)(13).
65 S. 5, at § 7(c)(3)(N).
8 Id.
81 S. 5, at § 7(c)(3)(J).
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about who should be selected to receive government financial
assistance from among the many who would be eligible.
C. Republican Alternatives
In 1988, several Republican legislators took major initiatives
on behalf of child care legislation. In September 1988, at the
height of the presidential campaign, Vice President Bush com-
bined the approaches supported by Senator Hatch (R-Utah),
Senator Quayle (R-Ind.), and Congressman Tauke (R-Iowa)
(along with Republican initiatives on such topics as funds for
schools where the Pledge of Allegiance is recited and programs
to attack youth gangs) into the American Family Act. Although
not fully rendered into legislative language and only partially
repeated in President Bush's 1989 budget proposals, the Repub-
lican campaign proposal can be described as a relatively coher-
ent alternative to the Democratic approach.
Campaigning for President, Mr. Bush supported an additional
refundable tax credit of $400 per dependent below age six for
children in families that include at least one worker and have
less than $20,000 in income, phased out at $20 per $1000 and so
providing no relief to children in families with income above
$40,000. He also favored federal funds for child care certificates,
but only for children in the poorest families and with little
emphasis on requirement that eligible centers meet licensing
requirements and no ban on participation by religious facilities.
Mr. Bush also endorsed federal funds for loans to encourage
creation of new child care centers, and some federal tax assis-
tance for establishment of on-site and near-site facilities by
businesses. 88
The plan put forward by Mr. Bush after he became President
was somewhat different. For each child under the age of four,
families would receive an income tax credit equal to fourteen
percent of wages, with a maximum of $1000 per child. In the
first year (1990), families with $13,000 or less in income would
Is Senator Hatch's bill, S. 2084, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 134 CONG. REc. S1,423 (daily
ed. Feb. 25, 1988), would have provided federal tax benefits both for businesses pro-
viding child care and for family child care providers, with steps to encourage the latter
to comply with local licensing standards. It would also have "reformed" state tort law
to reduce the vulnerabilities of child care providers to suits alleging abuse. Senator
Hatch re-introduced his bill in 1989. S. 692, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG. REc.
S3,251 (daily ed. Apr. 4, 1989).
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benefit. By 1994, families earning up to $20,000 would qualify,
but only those below $15,000 would get the maximum benefit.89
D. Comparing the Democratic and Republican Approaches
The 1988 and 1989 Democratic and Republican approaches
offer very different directions as legislative initiatives for ad-
dressing child care needs.
How much government regulation should there be? Every
Democratic proposal includes a high degree of standard-setting.
The 1989 ABC bill, for example, would mandate a process of
standard-setting at the federal level (over which the Secretary
of HHS would have limited influence), with states permitted to
declare stricter standards. The scope of national minimum stan-
dards for child care centers would "reflect the median standards
for all States." For all child care, national standards could not
be "less or more rigorous than the least or most rigorous stan-
dard that exists in any of the States." 9 Most Republican pro-
posals would provide funds (through tax benefits) for any child
care arrangement made by parents, or would provide (where
certificates or vouchers are used) far less in the way of govern-
mental-and nothing in the way of federal-standards. (Indeed,
the 1989 Bush proposal would give tax benefits to low income
families that used no paid child care at all.) The Democratic
proposals would attempt to put the legitimacy of the federal
government behind certain models of child care-certain defi-
nitions, certain levels of staffing, and certain minimum physical
standards for facilities. Some proposals would also encourage
or require substantially increased enforcement efforts to shut
non-complying facilities.
How much redistribution should there be? All Republican
proposals are heavily focused on the poorest families. Many of
the Democratic proposals would allow available funds to benefit
substantially more than half the population. It would be difficult
to estimate the net distributional consequences of such propos-
als without predicting whether better-off or less-well-off families
would manage to obtain the limited certificates for which funds
19 Wall St. J., March 16, 1989, at A18, col. 1.
90 S. 5, at § 18.
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would be appropriated. One can certainly predict that all ap-
proaches like that in the ABC bill would reward those who can
succeed in complicated, local scrambles for a desirable re-
source, and that these are unlikely to be the neediest families. 9'
For example, under the Older Americans Act, age alone-
not economic need-establishes eligibility for services. Reg-
ulations require that low-income and minority elderly be
served at least in proportion to their numbers. A GAO
study92 showed that Area Agencies on Aging had difficulty
meeting this requirement. 93 Neil Gilbert's conclusion is
that there has been in a number of social welfare pro-
grams a "drift toward universalism," as middle class
claimants have managed to obtain a substantial share of
limited benefits. 94
Will government funds assist parents who place their children
in facilities operated by religious organizations? The Demo-
cratic approach, by financing child care centers directly and
supplying certificates usable only at qualifying facilities, walks
head on into the religious issue. About one-third of child care
today is provided by religious organizations. 95 The ABC bill
thus had to ban expenditures which members of Congress pre-
dicted would not be permitted by the Supreme Court. It also
had to forbid expenditures so entangled with religion that
the bill would lose the support of public education groups con-
cerned to prevent any precedent for public aid to reli-
gious schools. Finding language that all elements of the
91 Neil Gilbert provides "axioms" that explain why the poor do not get their share of
discretionary benefits:
Less troublesome clients will be served before more troublesome ones.
Those who can pay will be served before those who cannot.
Higher status clients will be served before lower status clients.
Middle-class clients will obtain more knowledge about social service resources
to meet their needs than lower-class clients.
When both middle-class and lower-class clients know where resources are
available to meet their needs, the middle-class clients will be more effective
in getting at the head of the line.
N. GILBERT, supra note 22, at 70.
92 G.A.O., LOCAL AREA AGENCIES HELP THE AGING, BUT PROBLEMS NEED COR-
RECTING 33 (1977), cited in N. GILBERT, supra note 22, at 67 n.14.
93 N. GILBERT, supra note 22, at 56.
94 Id. at 47-66. See also Liebman, supra note 64, at 23-24.
95 See Whitehead, supra note 15, at 573.
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necessary coalition could support-language acceptable to
the American Civil Liberties Union, the National Edu-
cation Association, and the United States Catholic Con-
ference, for example-proved impossible in 1988, torpe-
doing the bill. In contrast, all Republican proposals seek ways
to assist families using religious facilities, either with tax
credits available no matter what the facility's sponsor or
with "vouchers" 96 cashable at religious as well as non-religious
facilities. 97
Are there any benefits for parents who stay at home? Repub-
lican, but not Democratic, rhetoric offers special solace to "tra-
ditional families," meaning families in which fathers work and
mothers remain at home. Some Republican proposals, including
the Bush 1989 plan, give the same tax benefit to a family whether
or not it obtains paid child care. A related issue is whether a
particular proposal assists a single-parent family in which the
parent is not working (and thus receives AFDC benefits). The
Bush refundable tax credit requires that there be a working
parent, and thus assists the single parent only when he or she
seeks training or obtains a job. All child care proposals must
now be coordinated with the Family Support Act of 1988 ("Wel-
fare Reform"),98 which requires AFDC recipients being provided
with child care to work or be trained, and that states begin (over
several years) to provide the child care that would allow job
training and work requirements to be enforced.99
9 Apparently, debates over school vouchers and housing vouchers give this word a
meaning that emphasizes wide consumer choice, whereas use of the word "certificate"
suggests more control by the issuer of the purposes for which the currency can be
spent. On the voucher movement, see N. GILBERT, supra note 22, at 32-40.
9 For discussion of constitutional differences between government expenditures and
government exemptions from taxation, see Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461
U.S. 540, 544 (1983) ("Both tax exemptions and tax deductibility are a form of subsidy
that is administered through the tax system"); New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 108 S.Ct.
1803 (1988); Wolfman, Tax Expenditures: From Idea to Ideology (Book Review), 99
HARV. L. Rv. 491 (1985); Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV.
1413, 1425 at nn.34-35 (May 1989).
"I Family Support Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-485, 102 Stat. 2343.
99 See id. §§ 201, 301-302 (1988). For an alternative vision, see Sarvasy, supra note
11, at 269:
I derive my conception of a feminist revaluing of nurturing and caretaking
work in part from the lost feminist potential of the mothers' pension concept
[AFDC]. A key aspect of this feminist potential was the assumption that the
mother should be viewed as equivalent to the civil servant or the soldier and
therefore entitled to public compensation .... [Tlhe concern is to revalue a
social contribution that both men and women can make and for which they
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Who has how much discretion in selecting recipients from
among those who can seek the benefit? Democratic alternatives
cast a wide net of eligibility; but because they supply funds only
for a portion of those eligible, these alternatives include proce-
dures for delegating the authority to select beneficiaries. Most
of the Republican proposals focus their benefits on the poorest
families.
E. Creating the Future Politics of Child Care
Hardest to analyze, what is the effect of the two approaches
on the future politics of the issue? There has lately been sub-
stantial commentary on the political difference between inclu-
sive and targeted benefit programs. 100 Social Security010 is "in-
efficient," in that it returns a great deal of money to the same
people from whom the money is taken in taxes. 10 2 But it is also
politically popular, as government officials have learned when
they considered cuts. On the other hand, it is often said that
programs only for the poor become poor programs. They cer-
tainly lack a constituency with political power. Also, inclusive
programs build an identity of citizenship, a sense of belonging,
a-may one use the term-"republican" spirit.103
should both be adequately rewarded. Today while it might be difficult to argue
for mothers' pensions, it is politically feasible to argue for caretakers' pensions,
which would provide social support, both financial and moral, for performing
the important roles of taking care of children, sick parents, or perhaps a friend
with AIDS.
100 See, e.g., Hacker, Welfare: The Future of an Illusion, in REMAKING THE WELFARE
STATE, supra note 11, at 290; R. KuTrNER, THE ECONOMIC ILLUSION: FALSE CHOICES
BETWEEN PROSPERITY AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 1984; N. GILBERT, supra note 22; Skocpol,
America's Incomplete Welfare State: The Limits of New Deal Reforms and the Origins
of the Social Crisis, in STAGNATION AND RENEWAL IN SOCIAL POLICY: THE RISE AND
FALL OF POLICY REGIMES 35 (G. Esping-Anderson, M. Rein & L. Rainwater ed. 1987).
101 In conventional American discourse, "Social Security" includes old age, survivors,
and disability income transfers, and Medicare's payment of hospital bills for the elderly.
102 On Social Security's political success-if such it is-in redistributing from better-
off to less-well-off see N. GILBERT, supra note 22, at 76-78; A. MUNNELL, THE FUTURE
OF SOCIAL SECURITY (1977); M. Ozawa, Income Redistribution and Social Security, 50
Soc. SERV. REv. 209 (1976).
103 See, e.g., R. KUTTNER, supra note 100, at 40-41:
To win broad popular support, social programs must be of high quality and
must serve the middle class as well as the poor.... [C]learly, there are equity
gains simply in having the poor and the nonpoor treated in the same hospitals,
educated in the same school system, and subjected to the same rules when
income supports may be necessary.
... [M]ost forms of means testing, though administratively efficient, are
politically doomed. Income-support programs narrowly trageted to the poor
are notoriously unpopular politically, as well as destructive of social citizen-
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But it is incorrect to see only the two choices of inclusive
programs (Social Security) and programs targetted on the poor
(AFDC, Food Stamps, and Medicaid). A third category is pro-
grams with broad eligibility but limited appropriations. The poor
may not be effective at competing with the middle class for
benefits. And the existence of the underfunded program may
not lead to expansion of appropriations because those who care
the most manage to obtain benefits.
The Democratic Party's approach to child care in 1988 and
1989 relies heavily on regulation. The proposed ABC bill would
place the national government on the side of child care of a
certain definition and minimum quality. Child care that is below
these standards would be dispreferred, perhaps banned, and at
least ineligible for subsidy. One likely consequence of this bill
is the formation of a more coherent provider community. It is
far easier to imagine effective participation by "owners" of for-
profit and not-for-profit centers, and by their professional staff,
than by grandmothers, unlicensed down-the-street providers, or
even at-home caretaker parents. 104
Second, the ABC bill defines a very large percentage of all
parents of young children as income-eligible for at least some
government financial assistance toward the expenses of child
care. When one imagines the median-or-above family as eligible,
the argument for subsidy cannot be redistribution. Rather, the
argument must be that all taxpayers should pay for those who
now need child care, or that the government should mandate
family income-shifting toward the years when child care is
needed. If enacted, this bill would thus legitimate child care as
a public good, which government should at least partially fi-
nance.10 5 Even though a small percentage of middle-income fam-
ship. Means-tested programs tend to be stigmatizing, invasive, and shabby
around the edges, especially when times are hard and the fiscal mood is
testy.... The recipients of middle-class social entitlements are treated as
citizens, while welfare clients are presumed chiselers until proven otherwise.
1o4 See Piven & Cloward, Popular Power and the Welfare State, in REMAKING THE
WELFARE STATE, supra note 11, at 91 (citing L. Salamon, Foundation News 17, 27
(July-August, 1984)): "There are now 17.3 million employees of social welfare agencies
at the federal, state, and local levels and in the nonprofit sector; of these, some 6.5
million work in nonprofit agencies. In all, their numbers are equal to union membership
in this country .... On the development of social services providers as an effective
lobbying group, see Smith & Stone, The Unexpected Consequences of Privatization, in
REMAKING THE WELFARE STATE, supra note 11, at 244-47.
105 Modem advocates of universal programs borrow many of their arguments from
Professor Richard Titmuss of the London School of Economics. See, e.g., R. TITMuss,
COMMITMENT TO WELFARE (1968). For the Titmuss arguments in the American child
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ilies would receive benefits at the appropriation levels likely in
early years, the fact that some families at each particular income
level receive benefits would make more families ask for such
benefits, and ought to make it more likely that appropriations
would be expanded in the future. 106
Third, since government would be authorizing services for
many, but appropriating funds for only a few, the program itself
would-to an even greater extent than now-become part of the
local political process, and would encourage families to partic-
ipate in community affairs (church affairs, local politics, ethnic
organizations) by holding out the program's benefits as a pos-
sible reward. Bringing participants to these institutions, there-
fore, might make their voices louder in the future.
The political consequences of enactment of a child care law
of the sort favored in 1988-89 by Republicans are very different.
These proposals would transfer funds to families through the
tax system, according to substantially non-discretionary criteria
of income and family status. Families would get the benefit
whether or not they used child care; and if they used child care,
whether or not the care met government standards. Thus gov-
ernment would be playing an allegedly more neutral role in the
care context, see, e.g., Weir, Orloff & Skocpol, The Future of Social Policy in the
United States: Political Constraints and Possibilities, in THE POLITICS OF SOCIAL
POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 9, at 444:
[High on the list of new policies must be adequate, publicly encouraged child
care provision to help mothers and fathers who work .... [The aim of
proponents must be to maximize the range of potential recipients and, when
possible, to provide assistance in ways that are not at odds with dominant
cultural values or with the capacities of the U.S. federal state structure. Uni-
versal programs would minimize the over-identification of public social pro-
grams with blacks alone, an identification that has bedeviled public intervention
since the Great Sdciety. By building broad clienteles, new universal measures
could also avoid the political vulnerability of social programs that targeted just
the poor.
106 See Brown, The Segmented Welfare System: Distributive Conflict and Retrench-
ment in the United States, 1968-1984, in REMAKING THE WELFARE STATE, supra note
11, at 195:
Democratic Congresses... sought to include more working-class and middle-
class families as beneficiaries of social welfare programs. The reasons why
were rather obvious: A program with a mixed clientele, one that straddled
social classes, was more likely to survive during a time of inflation and increas-
ing budgetary pressures than one with a narrow clientele .... The most
explicit instance of the Democratic party strategy occurred in connection with
the child care program proposed in 1971 .... Nixon ultimately vetoed the
program, though not because he was concerned about the state of the American
family, as he said at the time.
Works such as M. DERTHICK, supra note 27, and G. STEINER, supra note 63, cast doubt
on the likelihood that an inclusive child care program would achieve broad political
support while providing substantial benefits to poor families.
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selection of types of care and in parental decisions about
whether both parents should work. The benefit per family would
be smaller, so the willingness to change behavior to adapt to
this program would be less. No certified subgroup of validated
providers would be created, so it is likely that the provider
community would remain diverse and poorly organized. There
would be no validation of community organizations as the ones
in control of this benefit, so no incentive for community cohe-
siveness. Religious providers, at least some of which would
probably be constitutionally barred from giving service in return
for the federal certificates to be used under the ABC bill, would
gain under the Republican alternatives.
But surely the chief political significance of the Bush-Quayle-
Hatch-Tauke proposals for increased federal spending on child
care would be that only families of quite low incomes would
benefit; and thus (1) general regulatory standards would not be
promulgated, and provider interests would have less incentive
to enter the debate, (2) the coalition of present and potential
beneficiaries would be small and weak, and (3) the program
would legitimate child care as an appropriate subject of public
expenditure only for families of low income. The significant
official statement would be that most families ought to take care
of this need on their own.
F. Compromise
In early 1989, Senators Dodd and Hatch formed an alliance,
each becoming a co-sponsor of the other's child care bill. These
bills, which seem to point in such different directions, may
ultimately be joined in a single law which would have the federal
government do all the things sought by both approaches. 0 7 That
would be a strange animal, half donkey and half elephant. It
would do the regulatory work of ABC; would subsidize some
slots (though vastly fewer than the demand); and would grant a
small tax credit to poor working parents. Enacting a law of that
sort would add a degree of legitimacy to each approach. Essen-
107 The total price tag would be $4.5 billion. See Boston Globe, Feb. 26, 1989, § 1 at
12, col. 1.
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tially, it would put off to a future day the question of whether
the United States is to act systematically on the subject of child
care, and if so for which of the many possible reasons now given
in public discussion and according to which of the many possible
institutional forms. So far, our political process has-on this
subject as on so many-been unable to choose.
